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I. INTRODUCTION
T RADITIONALLY, end-to-end secrecy delivery relies on symmetric or asymmetric encryption residing in the upper layer of a communication system, as well as sophisticated key management schemes [2] , [3] . Without requiring a secure cipher, Wyner-type secrecy encoding provides a completely different solution to link-wise secret message delivery by random binning tailored to some presumed wiretap channel models in physical layer [4] , [5] . In this paper, we propose an encoding-encryption approach to end-to-end secrecy delivery by encoding over a degraded wiretap channel across superframes transmitted in the application layer. The resulting wiretap channel is created by injecting controllable noise into ciphertext after encryption, and determined by both the adversary node's uncertainty about the key of cipher and its limited resources in launching cryptanalysis. Secret information transmitted in such manner could be taken as keys for the subsequent superframe.
In the proposed framework, we are essentially exploring the techniques developed for physical layer secrecy encoding and cryptanalysis against symmetric block ciphers to serve our purpose of realizing end-to-end secrecy enhancement without resorting to exogenous physical channel conditions. More specifically, Data Encryption Standard (DES) block cipher working in Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) is taken to encrypt messages encoded using the Wyner type secrecy encoding scheme and then transmitted over multiple frames encrypted using different keys. Random binary noise is then deliberately added onto ciphertext, which are received by both legitimate user and an eavesdropper without any additional distortion. Such a hierarchical encoding-encryption framework allows us to transmit secret messages over the resulting degraded wiretap channels in the application layer without making any assumption regarding end-to-end physical channel conditions.
In order to analyze secrecy enhancement achieved by utilizing our encoding-then-encryption approach, we need to study how Eve responds to the existing noise in her gathered data, and how that influences her cryptanalysis performance. In our case, Eve attempts to mount her linear attack with accumulated noisy ciphertexts, and thus applies a new verification strategy in the second phase of the linear attack while considering her possible resource constraints. Our statistical analysis shows that even when she uses a numerically optimized attacking strategy to obtain the key, it is likely for her to make mistakes in cryptanalysis. These possible failures of Eve over multiple frames make her channel degraded than the main channel, which can be further exploited by secrecy encoder to send additional secret bits over a superframe. Therefore, we could utilize generated secret bits over the last superframe, whose secrecy is ensured by Wyner-type secrecy encoding scheme, to establish keys for next coming frames. The secrecy capacity of the system is computed assuming known channel states at Bob and Eve. Numerical results illustrate how deliberately added noise influences secrecy rate which can be further maximized at a certain noise rate. It should be noted that the primary goal of our paper is to demonstrate how secrecy encoding and symmetric encryption could be put together to enhance end-to-end security, and thus we only provide capacity computation without dealing with a particular secrecy encoder [6] .
In literature, very few analytical approaches have focused on the impact of noisy ciphertexts on the attacking performance. In [7] different security schemes are analyzed from both reliability and secrecy perspectives in the presence of channel noise; nonetheless, they do not discuss what modified strategy Eve needs to take adaptively against degradation, and nor have Fig. 1 . Cipher feedback mode (CFB) with DES cipher [7] . they considered further leveraging adversary's failures in its cryptanalysis. In fact, our approach shares a common spirit with friendly jamming schemes proposed in physical layer secrecy encoding [8] , [9] , where deliberate noise is introduced in physical layer to interfere both legitimate and eavesdropped links to improve the secrecy rate region. Unlike these works, we essentially explore the adversary's disadvantages due to its uncertainty about the secret key and resulting cryptanalysis failures in the presence of deliberate noise.
In addition, deliberate additive noise in encryption process was used to improve security of ciphers in previous works [10] - [12] . The primary goals in these works were to enhance the secrecy of a cipher by random binning and additive noise, but we are interested in deploying encoding-then-encryption framework to enhance secrecy by further encoding over a resulting degraded wiretap channel. Random measurement noise has also been considered in side channel attacks (SCA) where information about cryptographic operation is leaked through some physical measurements conducted by an adversary [13] . In [14] , authors proposed to use multilinear approximation utilized in Differential Power Analysis (DPA)-like attacks, which is powerful due its robustness against noise.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a preliminary description of CFB mode and linear cryptanalysis is provided. In Section III the proposed security scheme is described, and in Section IV, we design an optimized verification strategy for Eve. In Section V the main and wiretap channels are modeled, and then the resulting secrecy capacity is computed in Section VI. Finally, the numerical results are presented in Section VII.
II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Properties of CFB Mode of Operation With DES Cipher
DES is a symmetric key encryption cipher which has plaintexts and ciphertext of size 64-bit with the key length of 56-bit. Although DES is replaced by AES in some applications, it is still used and studied in many networks [15] , [16] . CFB mode is one of the operational modes that can be used to derive a key stream from block ciphers like DES [17] . We assume that block size in CFB mode is 64-bit. As can be seen in Fig. 1 [18] . However, since S-boxes in DES cipher are not ideal, the resulted bit error rate by avalanche effect is not exactly 0.5. This also holds in more advanced ciphers like AES [19] . That is why in our analysis we assume that when there is an error in cipher input or in the key, each output bit gets flipped with the probability of .
B. Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack which was first proposed by Matsui in [20] to attack DES. This widely used cryptanalysis approach exploits a linear equation with the probability of which involves some input and output bits of the DES cipher as well as some key bits. The quantity , called bias, measures the correlation among plaintext, ciphertext and the key bits, and can be used as a criterion to distinguish the right key. Before attack, Eve has to gather a large number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs, and then for each possible key value compute its corresponding bias by counting the number of pairs that satisfy the linear equation.
If we refer to as the number of attacked key bits in linear cryptanalysis, the number of subkey candidates would be that need to be sorted from rank 1 to based on their corresponding probability biases. It is not necessarily always true that the right key ranks the highest, but it will be surely among high ranked candidates. Assume that adversary only checks top candidates during exhaustive search, and since each subkey candidate gets checked with all possible combinations of remaining unattacked bits, Eve has to run exhaustive search with at most encryptions for each candidate. As a result, the total number of 56 key bits examined in linear attack with bit advantage is . In [21] , A. Selçuk showed that when the total number of gathered plaintext/ciphertext pairs is large enough, the probability of success , defined as the probability that the right key is among top candidates, can be derived as (1) where is the bit advantage of the attack, is the bias of the used linear approximation and is the cumulative distribution function of the standardized normal distribution.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME FOR SECURITY SYSTEM Fig. 2 illustrates the proposed scheme for secrecy improvement in which after encryption of the original message , intentional noise is injected into it to generate a degraded wiretap channel. Since we consider end-to-end secrecy, physical channel is assumed to be error-free. Therefore, the ciphertexts that Bob obtains only include errors caused by intentional noise introduced into encrypted data in application layer with bit error rate of . Moreover, because Alice and Bob agree on the key used for the current data frame, Bob can decrypt the obtained noisy ciphertexts and then apply the wiretap channel decoding algorithm that allows him to recover the original message with arbitrarily small error probability. As indicated in Fig. 2 , there exists an oracle, whereby Eve can query and obtain consecutive plaintext/ciphertext pairs. However, due to the deliberate noise, it provides Eve with noisy ciphertexts distorted with independent errors of rate . As the main advantage over Eve, Alice and Bob share the same encryption and decryption key which is unknown to Eve. Therefore, she has to adopt an attack strategy that can exploit the gathered noisy data in order to guess the secret key.
We assume that legitimate users initialize with a shared set of keys in a highly secure manner at the beginning. As a result, Alice can divide the whole data into equal size data frames, each including number of data blocks of size 64-bit which is the block size used in CFB mode. In this way, the same key will be used for 64-bit blocks in each frame for encryption and decryption at the receiver end. In this paper, we show that due to Eve's resource constraints, it is likely for her to make mistakes in assessing a frame key. As a result, Eve's channel is a degraded version of the main channel. We can leverage this advantage by applying Wyner secrecy encoding over superframes to average over all possible failures by Eve. In Wyner-type encoder redundancy is added to correct errors that occur across the main channel, and randomness is added for keeping Eve ignorant across the wiretap channel [4] , [6] .
Another issue is key scheduling problem to provide highly confidential and distinctive keys for each frame while Bob is fully aware of them. The traditional methods of key management like master/session key scheduling approaches [2] , [3] are sophisticated and costly. Here, we propose a simpler technique that derives the required secrecy for frame keys from secret bits delivered by Wyner secrecy encoder over the created wiretap channel. As a result, since encoder is performed over each superframe, Alice can use input to the encoder to extract frame keys in next superframe, for instance by applying a universal class of Hash functions over it [22] . Bob is able to decode encrypted data and obtain the encoded message, and thus he will be able to derive keys for next frames.
IV. EVE'S ATTACK STRATEGY AND ITS ANALYSIS
This section studies the effect of the channel degradation on the performance of the linear cryptanalysis in terms of Eve's success rate. Since linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack, Eve has to rely on the received plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Due to the existing errors in these ciphertexts, when Eve examines a key, she is unable to distinguish between errors caused by the received noisy ciphertext and the ones induced by using the wrong key. Thus, she needs to design a new verification approach that gives her the maximum possible success rate in finding the right key.
A. Designed Verification Strategy for Attack
Consider ciphertexts go through a binary symmetric channel whose crossover probability is . As seen in Fig. 1 , after passes through channel, and XORs with channel noise, the received noisy 64-bit ciphertext will have error with the probability of . Therefore, Eve can not rely only on two successive ciphertexts to check the correctness of a key, because they might have errors that can lead her to make mistakes. Indeed, Eve has to try a number of successive pairs, using CFB mode in order to increase her success rate.
In Fig. 3 , two consecutive stages of CFB that are used to check the key are shown, where and are respectively the plaintext and ciphertext for the stage, is the encrypted result of that after XOR with generates . Provided that the used key is correct, must be the same as , but due to the possible errors in or there might be some differences between them. Hence, Hamming Weight (HW) of XOR of and denoted by must be compared with a threshold denoted as . Then, a key trial for the stage can be considered successful if this HW is less than .
Note that at stage when there is an error either in the input to the cipher, i.e., or in the key, there will be burst of errors in , which makes totally different and in special case of independent from . Therefore, by choosing a small value for threshold and comparing HW of , Eve can know that either input to the cipher or the key is noisy. In Table I , the key verification strategy for Eve is given that she needs to follow in the brute-force attack phase of linear cryptanalysis to test the correctness of the examined key . In this strategy, Eve examines each key candidate times with consecutive pairs where is chosen such that with a high probability at least in one trial out of tests, input to the cipher has no error. Then, Eve can recognize the correct key when at least one of trials is successful.
Since when the examined key is correct and is errorfree, all the discrepancies between and will be caused by the possible errors in , we can determine the minimum value for such that the probability that the number of bit errors in exceeds denoted by becomes negligible.
In the next step, we need to find the optimum value for . Let be the hypothesis when the examined key is wrong and when it is right. Then, let be a random variable where defines successful trial at the stage that happens when HW of is less or equal to , and otherwise. By proper selection of , we can make sure that whenever there is no error in the input to the cipher, Eve can recognize the right key. Thus, probability of success event is (3) Eve misses the right key when all trials fail that has the probability of (4) We call key missing probability. Thus, we need to find minimum such that keeps below a threshold like . Now we need to compute the probability that Eve mistakenly admits a wrong key while examining a single candidate. When the used key is wrong due to the avalanche effect, will have bit error rate of , that after XOR with with bit error probability of , results in output bit error rate of as (5) Since to admit a wrong key at the stage as the right one, HW of must be less than , the probability of a successful trial at this stage for a wrong key is (6) On the other hand, Eve accepts a wrong key when there happens at least one successful trial for it. Thus, the false key probability for a single candidate is (7) where is computed by (6) . Even though this probability seems negligible, it gets aggregated over a large number of examined wrong key candidates, and can result in a nonnegligible false key probability, as will be seen in simulations.
B. Analysis of the Designed Attack Strategy for Eve
In [7] Yin et al. showed that in noisy environment with bit error rate of , for linear attack on DES cipher, the probability bias of the new linear equation denoted by , as well as the success probability of attacker can be computed based on the linear probability bias of the original linear equation and the number of obtained pairs by Eve as (8) If adversary uses the improved linear analysis technique, she needs to use Matsui's linear equation for DES that requires bits of plaintext and bits of corresponding ciphertext where to guess key bits [23] . As discussed in Section II-B, in linear attack with bit advantage of , the total number of examined keys is . If the ciphertexts that Eve obtains are error-free, her success probability will be which is the probability that the correct key is among top examined candidates. For the case that obtained ciphertexts are erroneous, the following theorem proven in appendix A quantifies the probability that Eve obtains the correct key, fails to get any key and obligatorily erases the whole frame or gets a wrong key. (9) where , and are given in Eq.'s (4), (7) and (8) . On the other hand, frame erasure probability will be (10) In addition, the probability that Eve accepts a wrong key denoted by can be derived as . Conclusively, we showed that there is possibility that Eve is not able to obtain any key, or to falsely accepts a wrong key.
C. Parameter Optimization of Adversary's Attack Strategy
Eave's objective is to mount a successful attack, and in order to achieve this goal, she maximizes the success probability of the utilized linear attack , given in (9), knowing that her computational ability is restricted to DES encryptions, and there is a constraint on the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs that she can accumulate. In the linear cryptanalysis designed for noisy environment, Eve runs at most DES encryptions, which due to Eve's computational restrictions, can not exceed . Moreover, we assume that before mounting attack on a frame of data, Eve gathers as many number of pairs as data storage capability and time limit allow her denoted by . As a result, she needs to design attack parameters including , and , to maximize the overall success probability subject to these constraints (11) From (9) we can see that to maximize we need to minimize and . Since according to (4) , mainly depends on , we can define threshold and find the minimum for which remains below . According to (6) and (7), to decrease we need to reduce as much as possible. If we define a threshold for , we can find the smallest for which remains below . Also, Eve has to choose an optimized value for to have maximized. The algorithm in Table II , is designed to optimize the linear attack parameters to let Eve achieve the maximum success rate , for a given . In this algorithm, and can be computed using (2), (4), respectively.
V. MAIN AND WIRE-TAP CHANNEL MODELLING
In this section, we model main and wiretap channels in block level (with 64-bit input and 64-bit output), using a stationary fi- 
A. Main Channel Modelling Using MC
As it was described, the encrypted data goes through a BSC channel with cross over probability of , created by intentionally introduced noise in application layer. We next model the CFB cipher, channel with deliberate noise and decipher altogether as a single channel, in order to analyze the effect of intentional noise at the output of decipher. Note that we assume there is no degradation in actual physical channel. Fig. 4 illustrates the encryption and decryption structure of CFB mode with DES cipher in the presence of introduced noise to ciphertexts. As shown in this figure, and are the sequences of transmitted 64-bit ciphertext and received noisy ciphertext blocks, respectively, and is the sequence of decrypted blocks at time for . In addition, is the sequence of 64-bit blocks of intentional bit errors in channel that are independent and identically distributed with Bernoulli distribution as for , such that . As Fig. 4 indicates when is noisy, it introduces errors with the rate of to the decryption output at time i, i.e., . Moreover, since gets encrypted with DES at time , due to the avalanche effect, it induces bit error rate of in . As a result, to characterize the channel error state in decryption output at time , it is required to consider errors in both currently received ciphertext and the previous one . Hence, we need to define four states.
Note that in a particular case when we consider , when has error, due to the fact that half of the ciphertext will be in error, errors in will be independent from and consequently from the error state at time . However, when it has no error, errors in will affect both decryption outputs at times and , and therefore the current state will depend on the previous one. As a result, we have to take all four states into account, each with a different transition probability from the input plaintext block denoted as 64-bit vector to the output stored plaintext denoted by 64-bit vector , and let denote the transition error vector. The channel states are defined as: state , in which there is no error from vector to the vector and happens when there is no error in and . State , which happens when there is at least one bit error in , but no error in DES cipher input, . State , which shows the situation in which there is at least one bit error in without any error in . In this channel state, due to the avalanche effect, each bit at the output of DES cipher, flips independently with the probability of causing bit error probability of in . State , in which both and have at least one bit error. For state we have and for , , where denotes the bit of for . On the other hand, we should note that in states and , output bits can not be treated independently because and are based on a given condition on the whole 64-bit ciphertext . Let denote the probability that there exists at least one bit error in as (12) The next lemma gives the input-output transition probability for states and , which is proven in Appendix B.
Lemma 1: Let be the input plaintext and be the stored plaintext in CFB mode. Assume that the generated ciphertexts go through a channel with error rate of . We denote the HW of the resulted error vector with
. Then, for state the input-output vector transition probability will be (13) where is the avalanche bit error rate, and is given in (5) . The transition probability in state for all is
Next, we need to find state transition probabilities. For instance, when the state at time was , apparently has been error free, so the only condition required to have state happen at time is to receive error free which has the probability of that is the transition probability from state to . Similarly, we can compute other state transition probabilities. Notably, since probability of occurrence of the current state only depends on the previous one, Bob's channel can be modeled as a four state MC that is depicted in Fig. 5 with the following state transition probability matrix: whose elements demonstrate the transition probabilities between different states. Note that in each state, input plaintexts undergo different channel conditions and error probabilities. In fact, the main channel can only be modeled as a BSC channel in states and with cross over probabilities of 0 and respectively, whereas in other two states it can be modeled based on input-output transition probabilities in (13) and (14) .
In particular, since in MC model for Alice-Bob channel, all four states can be reached from one another, it is an irreducible MC with positive recurrent states [24] . Then, with a supposedly large frame size, MC can reach its stable condition. Since all states are positive recurrent, the set of equations , and have a unique solution as where denotes the steady state probability of state for [24] . Where is a 4 1 vector with all elements to be one, and is steady state probability vector (SSPV). By solving this equation set, we get (15)
B. Wire-Tap Channel Modelling
When Eve obtains the right key of a frame with the probability of by using optimized verification strategy in linear attack, her decrypted data in that frame undergoes the same channel condition as Bob's. As shown in Fig. 6 , we refer to this channel state for Eve as the correct key state in frame level which occurs with the probability of and can be modeled as a MC with four channel states in block level. Nevertheless, with the probability of , Eve will not be able to get any key for the attacked frame and has to drop the whole frame. We refer to this state as erasure state. Moreover, Eve gets a wrong key with the probability of , such that after using a wrong key due to the avalanche effect in DES cipher, each bit in DES output will be independently flipped with the probability of . This induced error XORs with intentional i.i.d. channel noise that has bit error probability of . Consequently, in wrong key state, Eve's channel can be modeled as a BSC with cross over probability of given in (5). Conclusively, wiretap channel is a degraded version of the main channel that only in the correct key state can it be as good as Bob's channel. In fact, Eve's channel behaves like a pseudo two-dimensional Markov Chain (P2DMC) [25] with three memoryless states in frame dimension, each acting like another MC in block dimension as shown in Fig. 6 .
VI. SECRECY CAPACITY COMPUTATION
The next step is to quantify the secrecy capacity of the analyzed security system. The capacity of finite state Markov chains was calculated in [26] and [27] . In [28] and [29] the capacity of the finite state Markov chains with binary symmetric channels associated in each state, was studied. In [30] secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel modeled as a finite state MC is computed. To compute capacities, we assume that the channel states are perfectly known to Bob and Eve in block level, so what we compute is mutual information between the input and output given the current channel state, i.e.,
. In frame level, it is assumed that Eve knows the correctness state of each used frame key towards the end of each frame. Specially, this can be considered as the best scenario for Eve, providing us a lower bound for secrecy rate. The main purpose of secrecy capacity computation is to design a secrecy encoder which is applied ahead of the encryption in application layer over multiple frames. Namely, when the message is transmitted at a rate below the secrecy rate to Bob using a Wyner-type encoding technique [6] , [31] , we can have an arbitrarily small error probability for Bob as well as the maximum entropy for Eve. In the asymptotic sense, by secrecy encoding, users utilize Eve's failures which cause her channel to be a degraded channel compared to Bob's.
A. Capacity of the Main Channel
When channel state information is available, the capacity is the average of capacities that each one of these MC states contribute to the overall channel capacity [26] , [28] : (16) where is the channel capacity in state in bit per channel use. It can be computed as the maximum information rate between input and output vectors, and , respectively, assuming that the current state is known to Bob: (17) Note that our modeled four state Markov channel is uniformly symmetric because in any state, channel is output symmetric [26] . For instance, in states and , the channel behaves as a BSC channel. In states and , if we define the transition probability matrix as for , , , 3, its rows and columns are permutations of each other because according to (13) and (14), its elements only depend on the HW difference of input-output vectors. As a result, also in states and , the channel is output symmetric. In [26] it is shown that for uniformly symmetric channel in which noise is independent of inputs, like our modeled Markov channel, capacity can be achieved with distribution which is uniform and i.i.d. Accordingly, in this finite state Markov channel by uniformly distributed inputs, the mutual information will be essentially maximized.
In state , channel is error-free with capacity of 1, i.e., , and in state , it acts like a BSC with cross over probability of and the capacity of , where is binary entropy function. However, for and in which decryption bit errors are not independent, we need to compute the mutual information between input and output vectors, namely for , 3, that is (18) We assume that channel state is perfectly known to Bob. In the following theorem which is proven (in Appendix C) using Lemma 1, we compute for , 3. (19) and will be (20) On the other hand, for both states and , every output vector can be generated by introducing all possible error vectors over their corresponding input vectors. Hence, since all 64-bit input plaintexts are uniformly distributed, the output will also be equally likely, so for , 3 the output entropy is . Thus, by using (18) we can compute the mutual information for states and as (21) where is given in (19) , and in (20) . According to (17) the channel capacity in states for , 3 will be (22) with and given in (21) . We can analyze Alice-Bob channel as a finite state MC with steady state probabilities given in (15) . Hence, according to (16) Bob's channel capacity as the average of the state capacities can be computed as (23) where is the average bit error rate caused by the avalanche effect. In addition, and are given in (22) , implying that these capacities mainly depend on , , and . As a result, the main channel capacity depends on and which according to (12) and (5) are themselves functions of , for a fixed . Therefore, Bob's channel capacity mainly depends on the original channel cross over probability .
Lemma 2: Consider our four state MC model for the main channel with input vector and output vector . With equally likely input plaintexts, we can compute as
B. Secrecy Capacity of the Wire-Tap Channel With Noise
When Eve with the probability of obtains the right key, her channel capacity will be the same as Bob's, i.e., , but when with the probability of gets a wrong key, her channel will turn into a BSC with the cross over probability of , which has the capacity of . Note that, the erasure state does not contribute to the capacity. Hence, Eve's capacity will be (24) where is given in (23) . It is shown in [32] that when the main channel is less noisy than the wiretap channel and the mutual information between Alice at Bob are individually maximized by the same input distribution, the secrecy capacity can be computed as the difference of two capacities. In our channel model, the first condition holds and only uniformly distributed input maximizes both mutual informations, therefore the secrecy capacity will be as: (25) This result implies that secrecy capacity mainly depends on , and . Due to the fact that all , and highly depend on the channel error rate , the main parameter that impacts secrecy capacity of the system is intentional noise. Namely, if Alice can control the cross over probability of the channel, it is possible to adjust secrecy rate of the system. Note that Alice applies secrecy encoding over multiple frames in order to statistically average over Eve's possible failures in frame level, and also to enable Bob to do the error correction coding when burst of errors occurs. Basically, Alice and Bob has to use a well designed wiretap channel encoder, based on the computed secrecy rate in (25) . Notably, the main issue in this scheme is delay that is imposed on the system by applying multiple frame encoding that makes this scheme applicable only for delay tolerant communication.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The main objective of numerical analysis is to evaluate the effect of varying on secrecy rate in order to see if there exists an optimum value for for which secrecy capacity reaches its maximum. In simulations, we assume that Alice by controlling is able to generate a degraded wiretap channel. In addition, we assume that the whole data is divided into equal size frames, each containing as many number of 64-bit data blocks as four-state MC reaches its steady state, such that for each frame, encryption and decryption key remains constant.
Let us assume that is the maximum number of DES encryptions that Eve can perform to establish an attack on each frame. Because for instance, with a CPU having speed of 2.6 GHz, it takes for about 30 hours for her to accomplish these many encryptions. For attack optimization algorithm proposed in Section IV-C, the initial values selected for is , maximum possible value for is chosen , and the thresholds and are set to . Furthermore, we chose as avalanche effect bit error rate to be 0.5. To evaluate the effect of noise variation on the performance of the system, we changed from to 0.05 with 500 steps of size . Moreover, suppose that Eve is able to detect these step size changes on by probing the channel and each time is able to optimize all attack parameters using the parameter optimization algorithm. We assume that Eve is not allowed to use more than number of pairs in her attack. In Fig. 7 , overall success probability, wrong key and frame erasure probabilities are depicted as functions of for fixed number of pairs equal to . As this Figure displays with rising , is monotonically decreasing, reaching zero for , while wrong key probability goes to 1 for because of increase in . As discussed in Section IV-A, the obtained results for show that it becomes considerable for some channel conditions and can not be ignored. Moreover, the staircases in these curves occur in 's for which algorithm optimizes and changes attack parameters. In Fig. 8 curves of main and wiretap channel capacities as well as the secrecy capacity are drawn as functions of . This Figure shows that Alice-Bob channel capacity is monotonically decreasing with increase in while secrecy capacity rises up to its maximum value 0.3442 for and then falls. Indeed, this cross over probability can be considered optimum value for which secrecy capacity achieves its maximum.
In Table III optimized attack parameters using our proposed algorithm for four different 's, i.e., 0.001, 0.005, 0.01 and 0.0125 are given. According to this table, with increase in , the required number of trials for each key increases from 5 to 20 in order to keep below the threshold when it rises. The same holds for parameters and which to achieve the determined thresholds, have to increase with rising channel noise to maximize the overall success probability. According to our numerical results, Alice can adjust channel conditions by introducing deliberate noise in application layer to have , to achieve the desirable secrecy capacity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we showed that by introducing tunable noise in application layer upon the encrypted data, even though Eve utilizes an optimized attack strategy, the secrecy rate of the system Fig. 7 . Overall success probability, frame erasure, and wrong key probabilities versus channel cross over probability. TABLE III  OPTIMIZED ATTACK PARAMETERS USING PROPOSED  ALGORITHM IN SECTION IV-C can remarkably increase. In fact, Alice can achieve a sufficiently large secrecy capacity by adjusting the cross over probability of the channel using deliberate noise. This secrecy rate guarantees a highly secure and reliable communication using wiretap channel coding in application layer over multiple frames. For secrecy capacity computation we tailored the known channel states scenario. In our future work, we will focus on the unknown state case and also will consider a more generic cipher.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Suppose that all possible key candidates are arranged as from the lowest rank to the highest. Let be the hypothesis that is the original key and be the event that Eve decides that is correct. We define a Bernoulli random variable which is equal to 1 when the right key is among top candidates, and 0, otherwise. Thus, and . Let be the total success probability for Eve. Note that when , the right key will not be tested and consequently can not be found. Therefore, we have (26) The probability that Eve can realize the right key is For Eve to be able to find the correct key at rank , since she starts the test from upper ranks to the lower ones, there should not be any false key acceptance for ranks higher than , as well as a key missing event for rank . Hence, (27) Moreover, Decisions about all keys are independent, and all of the tested keys are equally probable to be the right one, i.e.,
. Therefore, by using (26) and (27) , we obtain (9) for total success probability.
The next step is to compute the frame erasure probability. Assume that the right key is and is located among top candidates. In order to obtain no key, Eve should not have any false key admission for , for , i.e., top candidates except the right key itself, and in addition to that she has to miss the right key . When is not among top candidates, since it will not be examined, Eve gets nothing provided that there has been no wrong key acceptance event for top tested candidates. As a result, frame erasure probability can be computed according to (10) . By a similar technique, we can prove that the wrong key probability is .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: We need to compute vector transition probabilities between all possible input and output vectors and for states and . Hence, for , 3
where is the decryption error vector which is bit-wise XOR of input and output vectors. The last equality is because depends on channel errors in previous and current ciphertexts, so given the state, it is independent from input vector . To analyze states and , we define two events, and as
As a result, , and we can write (29) The fact that events and are caused by two independent channel error vectors and implies that is independent of and its complementary, i.e., . When event has not occurred, since only can induce bit errors with rate of into the stored plaintext, the probability that a particular decryption error vector with Hamming weight of takes place will be (30) In state , HW of error vector can not be zero because we know that the only source that can induce error at stage is that surely has a nonzero bit. In this case, given an error vector with and knowing that event did not occur, we can infer that this error is induced by error in , hence event has certainly occurred, i.e., . Thus, using (28) , (29) and (30), we can obtain the input-output transition probability in as in (13) . Similarly, for state , can be computed with the detailed proof provided in our technical report [33] .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: If we assume that all possible input plaintexts are equally likely, for , 3 we can write
The second equality is resulted from (28) for as the decryption error vector. Furthermore, for state as discussed in Section V-A, HW of the error vector can not be zero. Thus, we can take as a 64-bit zero vector and exclude it from this summation. Then, using (13) brings about the following result (32) We know that out of all error vectors, the number of possible vectors with HW of is the number of possibilities of choosing bits out of 64 bits which is equal to -combinations from 64 elements. Finally, (32) can be rewritten as (19) by excluding . For state , we compute using (31) for . In this case, is not excluded because unlike state in state , it is possible to have decryption error vector with zero weight. Thus, by using (14) , we obtain in (20) .
